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Abstract 
In this paper, we investigate methods for managing congestion on the grid in the 
Nordic power market. Specifically, we have considered the differences between using 
counter purchases as opposed to pricing out the transmission constraints of the grid. 
We show that the specific method used for congestion management greatly affects 
prices and therefore the surplus of the various agents, including the system operator. 
This means that the market agents may have preferences for one method, and take 
actions in order to influence which method is to be used. Based on this we have 
studied the incentives and possibilities of “moving” capacity constraints, and the 
effect this has on system performance. We have also looked into the differences 
between various pricing schemes, i.e. optimal nodal prices versus optimal zonal 
prices. 
 
1. Introduction 
In deregulated electricity markets, managing congestion on the grid is a central task 
for the system operators. Congested paths may indeed impede access to the market for 
generators, thus reducing the benefits due to the competition for electricity 
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consumers, and creating potential market power for incumbent generators isolated 
from competition.  
The Nordic power market, with one (non-mandatory day-ahead) spot market, run by 
NordPool, covers 5 control areas, i.e. Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark (split 
into two areas). Its creation implied the implementation of congestion management 
methods to alleviate congested paths. Congested paths may appear at the borders 
between zones, but also inside each zone. Without a mechanism to deal with the 
transmission constraints of the grid, the integration of the electric systems would just 
be a fallacy. 
Nevertheless, the congestion management methods have not been standardized for the 
whole Nordic market, and differences remain according to the location of the 
congested paths. Two main methods are used:  
- zonal pricing for the large and long-lasting constraints internally in Norway, but 
also for congestion at the borders between different control areas, and 
- counter purchases for the internal constraints in Sweden, Denmark and Finland, 
and also to manage smaller internal congestions in real time in Norway. 
The trading process for zonal pricing works approximately as follows: 
1. Based on the supply and demand schedule bids given by the market participants to 
the spot market, the market is cleared while ignoring any grid limitations. It 
results in the system price for energy and the amount of electricity traded. 
2. If these exchanges induce flows overloading transmission lines, the nodes of the 
grid are partitioned into different zones on either side of the bottlenecks. 
3. A new pool price is determined in each area from the initial bids of the spot 
market, taking into account the maximum transfer capacity between the areas.  
Thus, in accordance with the supply and demand curves, congestion is relieved 
through a market mechanism. This mechanism results in a revenue for the grid 
operator equal to the price difference between the areas times the amount of energy 
transmitted across the zone-boundary. The characteristics of the zonal pricing 
approach are studied in Bjørndal and Jørnsten (2001). 
Counter purchasing is a completely different method as regards the trading process as 
well as the results for the market participants and the network operator. In short, it 
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consists in constraining off some generators, rather ”ill-placed” on the grid as regards 
the congestion’s location, and constraining on ”better-placed” generators so that 
demand could be met. 
The trading process to implement counter purchases works approximately as follows: 
1. The first stage remains the same as with zonal pricing. 
2. If these exchanges induce flows overloading transmission lines, the network 
operators check where injections into the grid have to be curtailed or increased, so 
that the congestion could be relieved. 
3. These increases and decreases are implemented through separated markets (the 
”balancing” market in Sweden and the ”regulation” market in Norway for 
instance). Agents offer adjustment bids on these markets, the sole buyer being the 
system operator. 
4. The system operator selects the less expensive bids for increases and decreases. 
Thus, some generators may be constrained off and compensated with the 
equilibrium price of the market for generation reductions, whereas others are 
constrained on and receive the equilibrium price for generation increases. 
This mechanism induces costs for the system operator since he has to buy and resell 
energy according to the adjustment bids. These costs are distributed among network 
users through the fixed charges of the network tariff. 
Recently, consumers have been allowed to participate in the regulation market, and 
there is also a joint regulation list for the Nordic market. Moreover, the regulation 
market is applied both in order to secure momentary balance between supply and 
demand, and for congestion management (“special regulation”). For the latter it is 
possible to pick bids not only based on price, but also based on the effect the 
generation or load has on the specific congestion in question. These changes serve to 
improve the potential efficiency of the counter purchase method.  
The aim of this paper is to highlight that the implementation of these two mechanisms 
may give an incentive to “cheat” on the rules. Thus, we illustrate by means of simple 
numerical examples that it is possible to “fake” a transmission constraint so that a real 
one could be managed. “Faking” a constraint on a given transmission line enables the 
use of one congestion management method rather than the other. Yet the relative 
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benefits of “moving” a constraint are highly dependant on the pricing rule used as 
well as the network model used to compute the prices. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an example of how it 
is possible to “move” a constraint from one transmission line to another. In the 
example we assume a full nodal pricing scheme. In section 3, we assume zonal 
pricing and see whether the results are affected by the pricing scheme. In section 4 we 
analyze an extended network to obtain more flexibility for the zonal prices. Thus, it is 
possible to check the effects of increasing the number of zones. Section 5 offers 
concluding remarks. 
2. A Simple Example with Nodal Pricing  
In the following example, we assume a linear and lossless ”DC” approximation of the 
power flow equations (Wu et al. (1996)), and we focus on real power. The flows of 
the network are determined by Kirchhoff’s laws, i.e. the junction rule and loop rule. 
The network considered contains 5 nodes connected by 6 electrically identical lines, 
like the grid of figure 1. In every node, there is both production and consumption, and 
we assume quadratic cost and benefit functions implying linear supply and demand 
curves. Demand in node i is given by pi = ai – biqid, where pi is the price in node i and 
ai and bi are positive constants. Supply is given by pi = ciqis, where ci is a positive 
constant. The parameters for the example are given in table 1. Demand is assumed to 
be identical in all 5 nodes, whereas supply is relatively cheap in node 1 and relatively 
expensive in nodes 2 and 4. 
Table 1: Cost and Demand Parameters 
Node Consumption Production
 ai bi ci 
1 20 0.05 0.1 
2 20 0.05 0.6 
3 20 0.05 0.4 
4 20 0.05 0.8 
5 20 0.05 0.3 
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Ignoring any grid limitations, the least cost dispatch of generation units entails the 
following electric flows: 
 
Since the dispatch is unconstrained, and we assume a lossless network, there is a 
unique price, the system price, which is equal to 16.842. The social surplus amounts 
to 3157. 895 and the grid revenue is zero since there is no congested path on the grid. 
Considering the unconstrained dispatch, let us assume that the flows resulting from 
the spot market clearing entail two binding constraints: the first one on line (1,2), 
whose capacity limit is 51 units, and the second on line (4,5) with a limit of 11 units. 
The constrained dispatch, maximizing social surplus while reducing flows on lines 
(1,2) and (4,5) below their respective capacities, gives the optimal dispatch depicted 
in figure 2, where nodal prices and flows are displayed. 
Due to the congestion, prices differ from one node to another. The variation in prices 
is about 3.17 %, i.e. rather small price differences across the network. As for the 
social surplus, not surprisingly, it is reduced to 3155.487 units. Indeed, the least cost 
dispatch had to be changed so that the congestion could be managed; hence the 
demand will be met by higher cost plants that, absent the constraint, would not run. 
Due to the congestion, these more expensive plants are constrained on. Nevertheless 
the social surplus is just slightly reduced, implying congestion costs of 2.408 units. 
 
Figure 1: Unconstrained Dispatch
1
2 4
3 5
49.123
56.140
21.053
28.070
14.0357.018
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Let us consider now that rather than directly manage the internal constraints through a 
decrease in flows on lines (1,2) and (4,5), we put a “fake” constraint on line (2,4). For 
instance, we put a capacity limit of 10 units on this line. Once again, the prices 
computed are the optimal nodal prices, taking into account a capacity limit on line 
(2,4). The resulting flows are displayed on figure 3. 
 
 
 
In this case, the variation in prices is much higher, entailing larger relative costs and 
benefits for the generators and consumers located at each node. Here, the variation in 
prices across the grid amounts to almost 10.2 %. The social surplus now equals 
 
1 
2 
3 
4
5
51.000 
46.172 
25.670
 11.000
19.498
Figure 2: Constrained Dispatch: C12=51, C45=11
p 3  = 16.807 p5 = 16.779 
p4 = 17.098 
p 2 = 17.070 
p 1  = 16.572 
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53
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Figure 3: Constrained Dispatch, C 24 = 10
p1 = 16.419
p2 = 16.213 p4 = 17.866
p5 = 17.246p3 = 16.626
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3137.356 units, entailing congestion costs of 20.539 units, where congestion costs are 
measured by the difference in social surplus compared to the unconstrained dispatch. 
Nevertheless, the congestion on line (1,2) and (4,5) are both relieved when we 
“move” the capacity limits to line (2,4), and this “fake” constraint changes the price 
levels so that some network users could take advantage of this. However, if we take 
into account the congestion management mechanism, the incentives given by putting 
up a “fake” capacity limit may become much higher. 
Indeed, we assume that this simple network represents in fact two markets linked with 
the cross-border lines (2,4) and (3,5). One of the markets, named market N is made up 
of nodes 1, 2 and 3, whereas the other one, market S, is made up of nodes 4 and 5. 
Consequently, the capacity limit of line (1,2) is now internal to market N, and the one 
on line (4,5) belongs to market S. This configuration can be seen as a stylized 
illustration of the Norwegian-Swedish grid. If the congestion management method 
used to relieve internal congested paths is different from the one used at the cross-
border lines, then the incentives to “fake” a constraint on line (2,4) may be highly 
emphasized. The costs for the system operator resulting from counter-purchases 
would then disappear and be replaced by a possible income from grid revenues. In the 
above example, the costs from counter purchasing would at least be 2.408,1 whereas 
the grid revenue when the capacity of line (2,4) is set to 10 units is equal to 22.732. 
We have already noticed that the “fake” constraint entails a congestion cost, measured 
by the reduction in social surplus, much higher than when we manage congestion on 
line (4,5) and (1,2) by putting capacity limits directly on these lines. But the 
calculations made up to now are based on a nodal pricing scheme for electricity. It 
would be interesting to see how the results are affected when zonal rather than nodal 
prices are computed. 
3. Implementing Zonal Pricing in the Example 
Zonal pricing is an approximation of a full nodal pricing regime and results from the 
aggregation of nodes into zones, thereby reducing the number of different prices in 
                                                 
1 This assumes that the system operator can fully discriminate prices for increases and decreases and 
that the original bid curves are used. 
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the market. Stoft (1997) shows that the partition of the network into zones is generally 
not obvious, however, he states that it should be based on price differences. Yet, 
Bjørndal and Jørnsten (2001) show that a zone allocation mechanism based on 
optimal nodal price-differences does not necessarily lead to a zone system with 
maximal social surplus. In practical zonal implementations, the nodes at the endpoints 
of a congested line would typically be allocated to different zones.2 
We consider again the simple example of figure 1/table 1. We assume that a boundary 
between the zones cut vertically lines (2,4) and (3,5), like in figure 4. Thus, the 
allocation of nodes into zones is fixed, which is more or less also the situation in the 
Nordic power market, as the national boundaries form fixed zonal interfaces, and 
Norway may be split into a few semi-fixed zones.3 Let us consider first a simple 
example with only two zones, the first one consisting of market S (nodes 4 and 5) and 
the second one of market N (nodes 1, 2 and 3). 
Obviously, the unconstrained dispatch will be the same as with nodal pricing, since 
we ignore any binding constraints. Yet, if we take into account now a “fake” 
constraint on one of the cross-border lines the results are completely different 
compared to the case of nodal pricing. Even with the same parameters, the way the 
prices are computed changes everything. Thus, as we did before, we put a capacity 
limit of 10 units on line (2,4) in order to decrease the flows on the real congested lines 
(1,2) and (4,5). The results are shown in figure 4. The flow on line (1,2) is reduced, 
but the flow on line (4,5) increases, thereby creating a potential conflict of interest 
between the system operators of the different zones as regards to the capacity 
announcements of the cross-border lines. The social surplus, equal to 3133.732 units, 
is reduced compared to the nodal pricing case with a constraint on line (2,4), implying 
that the aggregation of nodes into a limited number of zones increases the congestion 
costs, which amounts now to slightly more than 24 units. 
 
                                                 
2 Although this is not always optimal when we take into account more than one congested line 
(Bjørndal and Jørnsten (2001)). 
3 The zonal definitions within Norway are fixed beforehand, but can be redefined if there is special 
need for it. 
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If we put the capacity limit on line (3,5) rather than (2,4), the same potential conflict 
of interest appears with 14.540 units flowing on line (4,5) and 49.760 units on line 
(1,2). The social surplus is slightly higher and is equal to 3139.922. Thus, using a 
zonal approach to compute prices makes things completely different in our simple 
example. With only two price-areas, a “fake” constraint on a cross-border line is not 
enough to manage both the real internal constraints. 
Therefore, let us consider that market N is in fact split into three areas so that each 
node represents one zone. Market S is still considered as a single area. We could 
expect that this further split in the market should give more similar results as in the 
case with nodal prices. In fact, the social surplus is just slightly increased compared to 
the two zones’ case (3134.970 units with a limit on line (2,4) and 3140.792 with a 
limit on line (3,5)), and even if only nodes 4 and 5 are aggregated now, the flows in 
the grid resulting from a “fake” constraint are quite different from the case where 
nodal prices were computed.  
Table 2: flows on line (1,2) and (4,5) with a “fake” constraint on line (2,4) or (3,5) 
 C24 = 10 C35 = 5 
line (1,2) 50.472 48.936 
line (4,5) 15.517 13.738 
1
2
3
4
5
48.743
10.000
14.621
2.440
41.682
7.061
Area N
pN = 16.348
Area S
pS = 17.665
Figure 4: Zonal Pricing with C24 = 10
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Once again, “faking” a constraint on the cross-border lines succeeds in reducing the 
flows on line (1,2) below the threshold of 51 units, but fails to manage the congestion 
on the internal congested line in market S. 
Let us consider now that the zone-boundary could be moved, so that it cuts the 
congested lines. Lines (1,2) and (4,5) are consequently inter-zonal. Taking into 
account the real capacity limits of these lines for the dispatch of generation and loads 
gives interesting results, displayed in figure 5. 
 
Indeed, the social surplus amounts now to 3153.812 units. It is very close to the one 
resulting from the unconstrained dispatch, and thereby highly reducing the congestion 
costs to 4.083 units. Besides, the capacity limit of line (4,5) is not binding anymore. 
Thus, the management of the real congestion on the inter-zonal line (1,2) enables to 
alleviate the congestion on line (4,5). The allocation of the southern parts of markets 
N and S in the same area gives results that are very close to the optimal dispatch 
taking into account the capacity limits of the transmission lines. 
These simple numerical examples point out that computing zonal prices makes things 
completely different, even if we consider competitive markets without gaming or 
related strategic behavior4. Zonal pricing is not a mere simplification consisting of 
reducing the number of different prices; zonal pricing does also change the allocation 
                                                 
4 For a study of market power with zonal pricing, see Harvey and Hogan (2000). 
2
1
3
4
5
51.000
26.120
8.577
20.198
48.345
2.655
p1 = p3 = p5 = 16.645
p2 = p4 = 17.191
Figure 5: Alternative Zones with C12=51 and C45=11
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of social surplus among the market participants through averaged prices in each zone. 
Besides, fixing the boundaries between the price-areas, considering mainly the 
national borders irrespective of the electrical reality of the grid doesn’t seem to be a 
consistent way to implementing zonal pricing. As we have seen in the last example, 
fixing the zones according to the location of the congested lines could give much 
more effective results. 
On the other hand, the implementation of variable boundaries between zones may turn 
out to be quite complex. Thus Hogan (1999) computes the number of zones needed to 
implement zonal pricing in PJM. Even if the network is large and highly meshed, the 
results are worth taking into account. He uses actual data on nodal prices in April, 
May, June, July, August and September 1998. The criterion to select a zone is that the 
standard deviation of prices across the zone should be less than 10% of the average 
prices. It results in 94 zones in May, 75 in June, 57 in July, 52 in August and 64 zones 
in September needed to cover all the nodes. The zones are not the same in each month 
and sometimes, locations that should belong to one zone are not contiguous! 
Implementing zonal pricing in a network with only 5 nodes though isn’t really an easy 
case: there is indeed a lack of flexibility to aggregate nodes into zones with a uniform 
price. In the next section we will therefore consider a single constraint in an extended 
network. This will provide more flexibility in determining area-boundaries and area-
prices. 
4. An Extended Network 
We consider a slightly larger network consisting of 8 nodes, 4 in market N and 4 in 
market S. The configuration of this example (see figure 6) is also inspired by the 
existing boundary between the Norwegian and the Swedish grids. We still assume that 
there is both production and consumption in every node, with quadratic cost and 
benefit functions implying linear supply and demand curves. Compared to the smaller 
example, we now assume different parameters for the cost and demand functions in 
each location. Implementing different bi‘s could be interpreted as varying the sizes of 
the (nodal) markets. The chosen parameters given in table 3 seem well suited to the 
relative differences in the Norwegian and Swedish sub-markets. 
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Table 3: Cost and Demand Parameters 
Node Consumption Production
 ai bi ci 
1 20 0.02 0.8 
2 20 0.05 0.1 
3 20 0.10 0.6 
4 20 0.25 0.4 
5 20 0.02 0.8 
6 20 0.05 0.5 
7 20 0.02 0.3 
8 20 0.25 0.2 
 
The unconstrained dispatch of the generation units needed to meet the demand is 
given by the following flows: 
 
In this case, the social surplus amounts to 4779.574 units and the system price to 
17.702. This non-congested situation reflects the market potential, however, we 
assume that this unconstrained dispatch of the generation plants violates the capacity 
limit on line (7,8), which amounts to 90 units. The management of the congestion will 
imply costs, thereby reducing the social surplus, as it was already the case with the 
2
1
3
5
7
6
4 8
42.553
88.794
42.270
46.525 36.993
13.220
23.773
116.652
14.752
52.085
49.816
Figure 6: Unconstrained Dispatch
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smaller network, and again, the way this congestion is managed affects the final 
results for the involved parties. 
We consider first the constrained optimal dispatch, where generation units and loads 
are re-dispatched so that the flow on line (7,8) does not exceed 90 units. Nodal prices 
and flows are displayed in figure 7. 
 
Now the social surplus amounts to 4759.236, entailing congestion costs of 20.338 
units, and the single congestion on line (7,8) provokes different prices in each node. 
The optimal dispatch represents an upper bound on the social surplus that can be 
attained from any congestion management method. In principle, this solution could be 
obtained by nodal pricing or by a “perfect” counter purchase arrangement, taking into 
account the original bid curves of both suppliers and consumers in all nodes, and 
performing a least cost re-dispatch inducing a cost of 20.338 for the system operator. 
In this respect the nodal prices should be interpreted as nodal marginal values, and 
would apply only to the marginal quantities injected or withdrawn from the nodes. 
Zonal pricing should simplify these nodal prices or nodal values through a reduction 
in the number of different prices. Besides, zonal prices, in the same way as nodal 
prices, should reflect congestion costs so that the energy flowing on line (7,8) does 
not exceed the capacity limit of this line. In this network, we first implement zonal 
pricing with two zones: zone N, consisting of nodes 1,2,3,4, and zone S, consisting of 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
24.460
83.075 18.436
21.268
90.000
35.625
47.451 39.704
32.207
44.097
13.696
Figure 7: Constrained Dispatch C78 = 90
p1 = 17.443 p5 = 17.900
p6 = 18.053
p7 = 18.206
p8 = 16.832
p2 = 17.290
p3 = 17.137
p4 = 16.985
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nodes 5,6,7,8. Thus there are now three cross-border lines linking the markets. The 
results, displayed on figure 8 are quite interesting. Here again the flows on the 
congested line amounts to 90 units, but the change in the way the prices are computed 
alters the flows on each line in the grid, thereby changing also the social surplus and 
the costs of the congestion. Indeed, these costs now amount to 34.795 units, which is 
an increase of 71% compared to the case with nodal prices. Thus, even without 
gaming, zonal pricing alters generation and consumption in each node, in a way that 
increases noticeably the congestion costs for market participants. 
What is also interesting in this example is that if we take into account an incentive to 
“move” the congestion from the internal to one of the cross-border lines, it is possible 
to manage the internal congestion. Let us consider a “fake” constraint of 24 units on 
line (3,7). The resulting flows on each line are displayed in brackets in figure 8 while 
the results with the real constraint on line (7,8) are displayed without brackets. 
 
 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
82.512
(82.509)
10.198
(10.183)
19.460
(19.463)
19.758
(19.756)
90.000
(89.988)
24.013
(24.000)
48.459
(48.459)
29.479
(29.473)
17.528
(17.529)
Figure 8: Zonal Pricing (two zones)
pN = 17.066
(pN = 17.066)
pS = 18.168
(pS = 18.169)
53.033
(53.036) 39.218
(39.219)
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Thus, “faking” a constraint on the cross-border line (3,7) relieves the internal 
congestion5, and the zonal solution with the original constraint is replicated, giving 
the same flows as the real constraint and the same social surplus. However, since the 
constraint (7,8) is internal to price area S, it should have been resolved by counter 
purchases, and even if we assume competitive markets with adjustment bids equal to 
generation marginal costs, this mechanism entails costs for the network operator6. 
Resolving the constraint by zonal pricing on the other hand provides a grid revenue of 
18.359 units, putting the limit of 24 units on line (3,7). Therefore, there is an incentive 
to “move” the internal congestion on line (7,8) to one of the cross-border lines, so that 
the management mechanism would be zonal pricing with market splitting, and not 
counter purchases. Hence, the real congestion is replaced by a replica, which is 
managed through a market mechanism, i.e. the change in supply and demand resulting 
from the zonal prices in each area. 
Another way to cancel the costs of counter purchases would be to split market S into 
different zones, so that line (7,8) would become an inter-zonal transmission line. 
Hence, we assume now that zonal prices are computed with four zones, two in area N 
and two in area S, as depicted in figure 9. The boundaries cut lines (4,8), (3,7) (1,5) as 
before and, furthermore, line (3,4) in zone N and (7,8) in zone S. The results from 
moving the capacity limit to line (3,7) are displayed in brackets. Again we have 
assumed that the grid is operated as if there is a limit of 24 units on the flow of line 
(3,7). 
When we consider four zones rather than two, the difference in flows and in prices 
between the case where line (7,8) is limited, and the case with a capacity limit on line 
(3,7) is substantial. A capacity limit on line (3,7) cannot replicate the solution for the 
real constraint on line (7,8). The results concerning the social surplus and the grid 
revenue are also different, as displayed in table 3. 
 
 
                                                 
5 In fact, this could also be achieved by putting a limit on the flow of line 1-5. 
6 For a study of gaming with a counter-purchase arrangement, see Stoft Steven [1998], “ Using Game 
Theory to Study Market Power in Simple Networks ”, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 
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Table 3: Social Surplus and Grid Revenue with Four Zones 
C78 = 90 C37 = 24
Total Social Surplus 4757.316 4745.334
Social Surplus Norway 2601.446 2613.535
Social Surplus Sweden 2018.723 2092.515
Grid revenue Norway 17.650 -10.720
Grid revenue Sweden 120.506 29.149
Grid revenue lines (1,5) (3,7) (4,8) 42.971 28.754
 
By using the actual constraint on (7,8) there is a considerable reduction in congestion 
cost when moving from 2 to 4 zones (from 34.795 to 22.258, i.e. very close to the 
optimal dispatch), but hardly any improvement when the network is operated with the 
constraint on line (3,7). 
 
Once again, these figures point to the great interactions in an electric network, and the 
importance of operating a power system according to its real constraints. “Moving” a 
1 5
7
2 6
3
4 8
90.000
(88.567)
18.929
(19.425)
16.887
(19.431)
20.237
(9.879)
84.794
(82.431)
35.621
(29.454)
32.846
(24.000)
43.557
(48.457)
13.596
(16.110)
48.425
(52.977 35.816
38.856
pNN = 16.917
(pNN = 17.284)
pNS = 17.322
(pNS = 17.063)
pSN = 16.750
(pSN = 17.853)
pSS = 18.089
(pSS = 18.182)
Figure 9: Zonal Pricing (four zones)
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constraint, even with the same pricing rules and zones is not a neutral decision. This is 
very much illustrated by the differences that the agents experience as regards to the 
prices for the different solutions. The prices for the producers and consumers in node 
8 for different solutions are given in table 4. 
Table 4: Prices for Node 8 in Different Solutions 
Pricing rule and Constraint Price 
Nodal pricing, C78 = 90 16.832 
Nodal pricing, C37 = 24 17.836 
2 zones 18.168 
4 zones, C78 = 90 16.750 
4 zones, C37 = 24 17.853 
 
With four zones, the incentive to move the real constraint to line (3,7) vanish. Indeed 
the congestion on line (7,8) is managed through the price difference between the 
internal areas in zone S, thereby canceling the costs of counter purchases. Besides, 
keeping the real constraint brings about much higher grid revenues. Therefore, we 
could expect that “faking” a constraint would be much less interesting if the same 
mechanism was adopted to manage internal as well as cross-border congestion. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have illustrated the congestion management mechanisms used in the 
Nordic countries, i.e. zonal pricing on the one hand for the inter-zonal constraints, and 
counter-purchases for intra-zonal congested paths on the other hand. We have seen 
that the simultaneous use of these methods may give an incentive to “cheat” on the 
rules so that the congestion would be managed with one method rather than the other. 
It is indeed possible to replace a real intra-zonal congestion by a “fake” constraint on 
an inter-zonal line. The incentive is quite clear for the network operator that does not 
have to pay for the costs of counter purchases. The solution hence might be in a 
proper regulation that the network operator at least should enforce the same rules for 
intra-zonal and inter-zonal transmission lines. However, the incentive to move the 
congestion exists also for the market participants, that would face a decreased 
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transmission tariff resulting from the lack of counter purchases’ costs, and also 
(maybe above all) a change in the zonal prices resulting from the “fake” constraint. 
The incentives are all the more important as the boundaries between the zones are 
fixed since it is easier then to implement such strategic behavior.  
We have also seen that zonal pricing makes things completely different, as regards the 
prices of course, but also as regards the flows on the grid, the congestion, the social 
surplus and the grid revenue. Hence, zonal pricing is not a mere simplification of 
nodal pricing; the aggregation of nodes into zones with uniform energy price does 
really change the allocation of social surplus among the agents, thereby bringing 
about winners and losers in the market with different and conflicting incentives. 
Therefore, the consequences of choosing zonal rather than nodal prices are extremely 
difficult to anticipate. Moreover, the differences in the optimal dispatch and different 
zonal solutions as regards to congestion cost for “real” and “fake” constraints indicate 
that there might be a reduction in social surplus from managing a constraint through a 
replica. However, in order to assess the exact cost for society, we need to take into 
account in detail how counter purchases are carried out, and how this secondary 
market functions. Modeling this market interaction is a topic for future research. 
Finally, as the prices vary considerably according to which constraint is considered in 
the solution, the prices that results from managing a “fake” constraint may be 
misleading as a signal of the usage of scarce transmission resources. 
The subject investigated in this paper is related to the specific methods for relieving 
transmission constraints within the Nordic power market. However, the analysis and 
problems posed are of major concern when considering the integration of regional 
power markets with a meshed grid structure. Therefore, it should be of great interest 
for instance as regards to the creation of a European electricity market and the 
harmonization of various sub-markets within this.  
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